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Article 5

The Process of Forgiving:
An Inclusive Model
by
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The bulk of philosophical/ethi ca l di sc uss ion about forgiveness emphas izes
the importance of narrowing down the co ncept by definin g bas ic elements
or characteri stics, or spec ify ing conditi ons or good reasons in support of
the act of forgiveness. The goa l is to determine when fo rgiveness is
complete and ethi ca l or not. Forgiveness has bee n portrayed as an either/or
sort of phenomenon. Very little attention has been give n to what has been
called th e process of forgiving, I I in tend to deve lop th e idea of a process
by showing that fo rgi ving may be best ex plained in terms of a range or
continuum of forgiving. I will describe forgiving as an attitude with a bas ic
structure that allows for stages with di fferent degrees of mastery of
negati ve feelings and di fferent leve ls of und erstandin g of ethi ca l reasons
that j usti fy the process, I will show th at "try in g to forgive" may in fact
constitute the first step, both logica lly and psychologica ll y, in th e forgivi ng
J
process:
The Welch Case

Consider Bud Welch ' s agony over what should be done to Tim
McVeigh for cau sing th e death of hi s daughter and 167 oth er victims in th e
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. We lch is quoted as say ing:
McVeigh shouldn ' t get off easy. Loc k him lip for good, with no
chance to get Ollt. Is th at puni shment enough? The part of me that
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still screams "kill him" doesn't think so. But my Catholicism
teaches that even he has a soul, and we must at least try to save him.
I'm still too angry to deal with that now. But I'll have to be
forgiving if I am to have peace. That would be harder if he is
executed. I don't want McVeigh's death on my head. A lady from
Texas called me and said her husband had been murdered. After his
killer was executed, she began to feel guilty. She thought knowing
the murderer was dead would help ease her grief but it didn't - and I
don't think it would help me, either.
I am not trying to win converts. I just want people to think hard
about the costs of the death penalty. Killing McVeigh won't bring
my daughter back. The only way I can go on is to continue to
believe in the sanctity of life - even a mass murderer's.)
Welch apparently feels that his anger is still getting in the way of
forgiveness. I would like to suggest that Welch's reliance on values he
learned as a Catholic, saving a soul and sanctity of life, indicate he has
already taken the minimal first step in the forgiving process.

The First Step of Forgiving
For purposes of this article, forgiving will be described as an
attitude shaped in response to injury inflicted on oneself and/or one's
family or close friends. 4 The forgiver must be aware that moral wrong was
done by an individual, or individuals, who was responsible for the act and
is the object of forgiving. 5 This awareness, however, should be based on
objective fact as far as possible to avoid subjective fabrication or projection
on the forgiver ' S part.
The forgiver also experiences an emotional response to the
wrongdoing. Negative emotions nearly always constitute the first line of
6
defense against inflicted injury .
Ever since Joseph Butler , the
philosophical literature has concentrated on resentment as the most potent
and debilitating of the negative emotions. Robert Solomon characterizes
resentment as the " villain of the passions. It is among the most obsessive
and enduring of the emotions, poisoning the whole of subjectivity with its
venom ... ,,7 But other feelings may accompany an injury, singly or in
combination, as mentioned by various authors: hatred , bitterness, hostility,
outrage,
contempt,
indignation,
averSIOn ,
anger,
sadness,
or
disappointment.
The above presuppositions describe the relevant background
against which an individual may make a two-fold decision that forms the
basic structure of a forgiving attitude. The first decision is negative, to
refrain from inflicting injury in return for wrong done.
Welch, for
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example, appears to have decided not to seek personal revenge. Nor does
he think that the state should kill the wrongdoer on his behalf. The
decision to personally forgo retaliation is necessary but not sufficient to
distinguish an intention to forgive from an intention to seek revenge. An
additional intention seems necessary to give a positive focus to the
individual's attitude toward the wrongdoer. As a bare minimum, it would
seem that another feature of the structure of forgiving would have to draw
upon the forgiver's general attitude of goodwill towards others and have
some aspect of that focused on the wrongdoer. I contend that Welch ' s
references to McVeigh's soul and the sanctity of life are evidence of a
minimum of goodwill already extended toward McVeigh and a decision of
Welch to commit to do more over time. Unlike others who have been
quoted in the press, Welch does not vilify McVeigh as a degenerate animal,
as one who does not deserve to live, who has forfeited all human rights.
Another survivor gives voice to such a vengeful attitude: " I don ' t want
McVeigh to have the freedom to even get a drink of water in his cell."g
Even though Welch has not yet worked out his personal feelings toward
McVeigh and has not found the peace of mind he is longing for, he seems
to illustrate a first step in the process of forgiving . He already possesses the
goodwill that can spur further changes in the way he thinks and feels and
acts towards McVeigh .
Recognizing the need to forgive is already a stage in the forgiving
process. The stage may be characterized as ethical to the extent that the
forgiver also has a sense that a good reason is necessary to justify the
forgiving. Welch eventually may draw upon his Catholic background to
supply him with a ready source of credible moral concepts and reasoning.
But even before he explores this resource in more depth , if he does, it may
be possible to identify in him an initial awareness that manifests the bare
minimum of justification for forgiving . He seems to possess, at the very
least, an intuitive sense that it is the right thing to do, to personally do no
harm to the wrongdoer and to try to do some good that acknowledges that
the wrongdoer still has some moral standing in the community.
This initial awareness suggests a posture of openness and
willingness to explore the forgiving path. My thesis is that this posture
already is a part of, not just preliminary to, the process of forgiving. This
posture may serve as the general framework that gives initial structure to
the process of ethical forgiving. Overall evaluation of an individual ' s
response to wrongdoing depends on such variables as the sincerity of the
goodwill intention, the quality and duration of negative feelings , the quality
and depth of self-awareness and reflectiveness about moral reasons, the
strength of commitment to act, and the consistency of action. But on the
whole, evaluation must bear on the life story that recounts the process of
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response to a case of wrongdoing rather than a single decision or act of the
forgiver. The phrase, " trying to forgive ", may well sum up, not someone
who has yet to make up their mind to forgive, but rather the story of
someone in the process of forgiving and also struggling as long as it takes
to reach closure. The phrase, " trying to forgive ", also implies that in some
9
cases forgiving lasts a lifetime and closure is never complete.

Negative Feelings
The process model sketched above suggests that the initial attitude
of goodwill toward the wrongdoer is consistent with the process of some
negative feelings in the forgiver, in the beginning and perhaps throughout
the forgiving process. Thus, Welch can be angry but still want some good
for the wrongdoer. Over the long run , however, one measure of the
sincerity of an individual' s attention to show goodwill is success in coming
lO
to terms with one ' s feelings so that one can find so me inner peace , but
also so that one can avoid jeopardizing one ' s relationship or connection
with the wrongdoer and one "s role in the o ngoing life of the community. In
most cases, hopefully, the forgiver can gradually diminish unwanted
feelings that are destructive of self and others. I I But even in the worst case
scenario, when feelings cannot be overcome entirely, acts of forgiving have
ethical value if there prevails an intention to show the wrongdoer some
goodwill and there is sincere effort to act in accordance with this intention.
H.J.N . Horsbrugh , one of the few to characterize forgiveness as a
process, shares with many authors the view that forgiveness is the complete
overcoming of negative feelings. Even though he distinguishes between
the original volition to forgive that begins the process and the level of
achievement which may take time, he clearly places emphasis o n the ideal ,
the point of fruition when all negative feelings are, in his words,
"extirpated ."
He compares thi s to hitting the bull's-eye.
But the
impression is that he is thinking of a kind of competition in which a person
has one or a limited number of arrows to shoot, and hitting the bull is what
wins the prize. In my model , the analogy is more like developing a virtue
that includes commitment to practice as long as it takes to master the skill
of consistently hitting the target and perhaps over time finding the bull
more often than not. In the best case scenario, in a particular practice
session, one hits the bull repeatedly and then feel s no further need to be on
the archery range . This illustrates reaching the point of having managed to
control one's feelings satisfactorily in one specific case of forgiving. Then
the person only returns to the archery range the next time one is called to be
forgiving. If the virtue of forgiving is well-developed, it may take less time
to get back into the groove of being consistently on target. My ve rsion of
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the archery analogy seems more realistic and is comparable to other
challenging situations that require us to continuously struggle, as we seek
to reaffirm our initial resolve to show goodwill to others and keep our
caring skills sharp. Rare is the occasion when we experience the
"spontaneous reversal of feeling" that Horsbrugh says can occur when the
decision to forgive in a quarrel between old friends happens almost
automatically.12 Horsbrugh and others would have us aspire to this ideal,
but then warn us that failure to achieve the ideal means forgiveness is not
yet within our grasp. My view is that the intention to show the wrongdoer
some goodwill itself provides a minimum of ethical integrity to forgiving,
both in its beginning stage and throughout the process, however long it
takes.
J.G. Haber offers an alternative to Horsbrugh when he argues that a
key element defining the meaning of forgiveness is the sincere intention to
will away resentment. The expression, " I forgive you ," among other
things, must mean that the individual actually has overcome resentment.
This agrees with Horsbrugh ' s position . Or, " I forgive you" may mean that
the individual "is at least willing to try to overcome it [resentment]. " I) This
second meaning is consistent with the model I am advocating above The
intention to show goodwill should include a commitment to overcome
resentment. Haber, however, does not acknowledge that other negative
feelings need to be included in such a commitment. Nor is he willing to
grant that forgiveness has moral status based on such a commitment. He
argues that the only sufficient rea son that makes forgiveness amoral act is
sincere repentance on the part of the wrongdoer. Again, this seems to focus
on a particular ideal that may define what constitutes " authentic"
forgiveness , the fullness of realization of forgiveness . My concern is to
show that we need to develop a minimal meaning for moral forgiving
which serves as a general form that can manifest different degrees of
realization depending on level of mastery of negative feelings, whatever
they may be, and depending 011 the quality of reasons used to justify the
forgiving as ethical.

Ethical Reasons that Justify Forgiving
The foundational reason advocated in this paper for determining
what is ethical is the general intention to show goodwill to the wrongdoer.
Further specification and expansion of this reason is possible by integrating
one or more reason s elaborated on in different models of ethical forgiving
found in the literature.
Welch ' s allusion to peace of mind s uggests that egocentric reasons
may dominate at an early stage in the forgiving process.
But self-
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preservation is not necessarily incompatible with goodwill unless a sense of
altruism is virtually absent. It might be absent if a person were to say " I
forgive you," and have in mind: " I just can't stand the hurt of it anymore
and want to be done with it," or " I need to get rid of the guilt I feel in not
forgiving." If no element of goodwill is present in the individual ' s
awareness and intention, then it seems that even though the word
" forgiveness" is uttered (or thought), the basic meaning of the concept, at
least as I have articulated it, does not apply and use of the term is
inappropriate.
Most of the philosophical literature goes beyond egocentric reasons
and stresses the larger goals of reconciliation and restoring/building the
moral community as the basis for good reasons that justify ethical
forgiving. My purpose in summarizing some of the options below is not to
defend a particular model but only to show that the minimal approach that I
am developing is consistent with all of the models. My thesis is that
forgiving admits of degrees, of which one dimension i the quality of the
ethical reasons cited to justify a process of forgiving actions. Most of the
discussion in the literature has grappled with how to adjudicate such
quality and determine the best model. I will group these models under two
approaches, one which emphasizes self-reform of the forgiver, and the
other the transformation of the wrongdoer.

Self-Reform of the Forgiver
Joseph Butler and many others call for keeping a tight reign on
resentment and other negative emotions so that constructive relationships
can be maintained. 14 Others see a need for a change of heart in the
forgiver. Jean Hampton asks us to see the wrongdoer in a new light, in
effect to separate the sin from the sinner as Augustine suggested. IS
Cheshire Calhoun challenges us to show respec t for wrongdoers by
sympathetically entering into their life hi stories and stop demanding that
they be different from what they are. 16 Joanna North contends that a willed
change of heart is the key to restoring damage done to relationships .17
Appeals to humility, characteristically found in the Judeo-Christian
tradition , tend to encourage un ilateral forgivcnes s. 18 As individuals reflect
on their own moral history, they realize that they have been in need of
forgiveness , have been forgiven , and so should forgive others, even to the
point of " forgiveness of enemies. ,1'1 Self-transformation, of course, also
may have the positive effect of facilitating transformation of the
wrongdoer. Forgiveness as proof of love may be more powerful than
punishment in touching the heart of the wrongdoer, according to Hastings
Rashdall. 20
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In sum these self-reform models tend to view forgiveness as
unconditional and unilateral. They often refer to respect for others and
love and compassion as operative principles or virtues to achieve
reintegration of the wrongdoer into a relationship or into the community.

Transformation of the Wrongdoer
Repentance has received the most attention in models that require
signs of transformation of the wrongdoer to justify forgiveness . Regret and
the promise to do no wrong in the future are the basic elements of
repentance cited. Haber sees repentance as necessary to " negate the
justifiability of the injured party' s resentment," and to preserve the victim ' s
21
John Wilson shows that repentance is a means to
self-respect.
reconciliation since it restores a kind of equality between the wrongdoer
and the forgiver based on "norms of fair play.,,22 If you don ' t play by the
rules of a relationship or society, then you have to pay a penalty. Justicerelated reason s may include references to the humiliation and suffering
a lready experienced by the wrongdoer. 2:l
The Welch case suggests a tran s formation model based on the
Catholic idea of satisfaction or penance. In the Sacrament of Penance or
Reconciliation, the wrongdoers receive abso lution after confess ing sins, but
must commit to restoring their spiritual health. Doing penance is the means
and , in the words of the New Calholic Catechism, may " consist of prayer,
an offerin g, works of mercy, se rvice of [sic] neighbor, voluntary selfdenial, sac rifices, and above all the patient acceptance of the cross we must
bear [that is, to assoc iate oneself with the suffering and death of Christ].,,24
Justice as well may demand repair of the harm done by means of
compensation for injuries, etc.
T ran sformation models also may focus on the future potential of
wrongdoers.
Hannah Arendt argues that forgiveness is necessary to
counter " the predicament of irreve rsibility. ,,25
Persons cannot move
forward in their li ves, in case or serious wrongdoing, if we cannot be
released from the consequences of their deed s.
Model s that require tran sfo rmation of the wrongdoer tend to v iew
forgiveness as cond iti onal and bilateral. They refer to mutual respect and
justice as the principles necessary for restoring a sense of community
among moral equals.

Conclusion
This paper has outlined a position that defines ethical forgiving as a
process guided primaril y by an intention to show goodwill to the
August, 1999
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wrongdoer. The va lue of thi s approac h is that it fits w ith commonsense
experience that forgiving, like oth er forms of action in vo lvin g commitment,
admits of degrees of realizatio n. This approach avoids the problems of
exclusiveness and re lativi sm re lated to other model s. Many mode ls of
forgiveness describe an exclusive idea l standard that leaves little room for
our ordinary experience of progress ing (a nd so metimes regress ing) through
stages of development from lowe r through higher leve ls of ethical
forgiving. With a deve lopment mode l, o ur intuition is that we can function
ethically even while strugg lin g with our fee lings and while trying to sort
out o ur reasoning. Other commentators suggest that the term forgiveness
defies easy categorization because it has as many mea nin gs as indi viduals
use it to mean . This re lativi stic approach o nl y serves to confuse
forg iveness with other concepts like mercy, pardon, condonation ,
absolution, excuse, exoneration, and leni ency; and in th e extreme,
forgi veness eve n has been construed as a form of retaliation. 16 My pos ition
makes the modest claim that forgiving in c ludes a core mea ning that can
accommodate definition s of th e idea l at one end o f a continuum and the
first minimal step of ethical fo rgivin g at th e oth er. But th ere is an
identifiable continuum that clearly differentiates forg iving from other
related concepts.
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